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what we ought to do. We may distinguish between an
ethics of action, addressed to the question "What should
we do?" or "What ought to be done?" and an ethics of
virtue in which the central question is "What ought we
be?" or "How shall we live?" In many contexts, and on
many theories, these are simply variant approaches to
the same goal. We should be the sorts of people who
freely choose to act in the way we ought to act. We
ought to do those things we would naturally choose if
we were the right sort ofpeople. Until the last few years,
much of modern moral philosophy, at least in the
English-speaking world, has emphasized the ethics of
action much more than the ethics of virtue. In this paper
the distinction will be of little importance. 2
Ethics, then, is concerned with what ought to be
(what we ought to do, what we ought to be, the right
and the wrong). Science, taken very generally, is
concerned with what is (what the world is like, the true
and the false). There is more to science than a collection
of facts. Even if it were possible for us to know and to
express all the truths there are, a complete listing of
them would not constitute an adequate science. At a
minimum, there is an additional need to subsume
particular truths under general laws. And further, a
proposed law of science may cover all the relevant
phenomena yet still be unsatisfactory if it lacks
explanatory force. It is important to stress this. The
concerns of science are not limited to covering facts;

This paper has two purposes, first to discuss the nature
of ethics (or moral philosophy, I take these terms to be
equivalent) and second to examine the notion of moral
status in general and in particular the moral status of
nonhuman animals. l
The practical importance of the second purpose will
be apparent to readers of this joumal. But the fIrst purpose
must come first, I believe, in order to counter a number
of fundamental but widespread misconceptions of ethics.
It is widely believed that ethics is relative to particular
cultures in a way that science is not, or that ethics is not,
as science is, objective, or that ethics is somehow
intrinsically emotional. These beliefs lead to the
conclusion that rational and productive work on ethical
questions is just not possible. If rational justification of
ethical positions is taken to be impossible, one need not
concern oneself with the justification of one's treatment
of illlimalS. Those who object to accepted, customary,
uses of illlimals are just being "emotional."

PHILOSOPHY

I
What is ethics? Ethics is a field of study (or the content
of that field) concerned with what ought to be or with
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the facts are also to be explained. Inattemion to this
essential prut of tlle mission of science conl1ibutes to
the mistaken belief that moral philosophy (and
philosophy in general) is radically unlike science.
Science and philosophy are bOtll aUempts to make
sense of our world, to explain things. In l1le Greek
origins of Westem philosophy and science tile two are
sometimes inextricably intermixed and sometimes just
indistinguishable. AltllOUgh today it is quite easy to
distinguish some sorts of sciemific activity from some
sorts of philosophical activity, it is still true tlmt many,
perhaps most, of the most interesting scientific questions
either just are philosophical questions or border on and
shade into philosophical questions.
In principle, tlle bedrock of science is observation.
Scientific tlleory must aCCOulll for tlle observations, save
tlle phenomena. Observations are not simply glances,
glimpses, or impressions. Not everyl1ling someone
claims to have seen, observed, or just come to believe
counts as an observation. Putative observations have
to measure up to certain standards, which may be more
or less well-defined, depending on tlle field. We are
quite willing to tllrow out supposed observations as
simply mistaken, biased, fraudulent, hallucinatory, or
otherwise spurious.
A theory constructed to account for a set of
observations may end up presenting an explanatory
framework tllat includes most of tlle observations, but
leaves some of them out. What happens in these
situations? Suppose our tlleory covers 95% of the
observations, but cannot account for tlle remaining 5 %.
We of course simply reject tlle deviant 5% as due to
"experimental enol''' of some unknown sort. In otller
words, even though observations are basic, we are quite
willing to sacrifice observations to tlleoretical simplicity
and/or explanatory power.
The tlleoretical structure of science tllat I have just
sketched in a manner botll crude and idealized is
exactly parallel, I shall argue, to the theoretical
structure of etllics.
Conesponding to scientific observations are our
"intuitions" of right and wrong, good and bad. Just as
observations are not gl~U1ces or momentary impressions,
so intuitions are not just transitory emotions or
responses. Intuitions are our retlective evaluations, our
approvals and disapprovals "in a cool hour" (to use
Hume's phrase). If one's upbringing has been deficient
in a certain way, one may at first react to tlle sight of a
racially mixed couple with unretlective disapproval.
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However, one may well, upon very brief retlection,
reject one's own reaction and replace it by tlle intuition
tlmt there is nothing amiss. Why would one reject one's
initial reaction? Because one is unable to justify it on
the basis of moral theories or principles that one
accepts as otherwise satisfactory. Moral theories are
satisfactory if and to the extent that they account for
most, or tlle most central of, our intuitions, if they
possess explanatory power, and so on. At a high level
of generality tlle criteria for the adequacy of moral
tlleories are the same as those for the adequacy of
scientific theories.
My intuitions can, over time, change as a result of
my acceptance of a moral theory or some elements of
a moral theory and as a result of other factors. What I
perceive (intuit) as right and wrong, good and bad, is
obviously intluenced by my upbringing, my antecedent
beliefs bOtll moral and factual, by my culture, and by
the views of friends and family. That is, my moral
illluitions are significantly affected by a wide range of
prior corrunitrnents and inclinations. And something
very similar is true of scientific observations. It is
hm'dly news, at this date, to be told tllat scientific
observations are "tlleory-laden" and subject to bias from
many sources. We see what we are looking for, we
categorize our experience and perceive our environ
ment witllin tlle limits of the conceptual frameworks
we bring Witll us to tlle laboratory, to tlle classroom,
to tlle market. We see what we look for, and we can
see only what we are ready for. This point is at least
as old as Kant and has been a commonplace in the
philosophy of science since the 1950s. When a physicist
looks at a cloud chamber, or a neuroscientist at a brain
tissue section, tlley see more than ml ignorant observer
such as myself. I may see a beautiful pattern, perhaps,
but no more, while the physicist sees alpha particles
and tlle neuroscientist sees old and new cortex. Those
things are really there, and my eyesight is quite
adequate, but I can't see them because I don't possess
the relevant theory. (Because the patterns have
meaning for tlle scientists it may be more difficult for
tllCm to appreciate tlle sort of beauty I may see in the
images.) Our commitments, our inclinations, our
theories intluence our scientific observations and our
moral intuitions alike.
It may not be mniss at tllis point, since I have just
mentioned tlle intluence on one's ethical intuitions of
one's cultural background, to tum to the claim that
different cultures have different ethics. It is of course
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true Ulat different cultures may well instill in their
members different beliefs about right and wrong. But
it certainly does not follow that all Ulese beliefs are
equally correct. Different cultures may instill in Uleir
members different scientific beliefs. If Cora Du Bois
is correct, the Alorese in the late 1930s believed iliat
numerous acts of intercourse were necessary for Ule
formation of a human fetus and, thus, iliat a single act
of intercourse could not suffice for the birth of achild. 3
The Alorese were just mistaken. The cultural
transmission of a belief is no evidence for its
correctness. Some at least of my ancestors believed that
buman slavery (of "inferior races") was morally
acceptable, and this belief was culturally transmitted.
They were wrong. A society can embody and transmit
false eUlical beliefs just as it can embody and transmit
false scientific beliefs. My ancestors' slavery-justifying
beliefs were no more true than were the Alorese
reproductive beliefs.
People sometimes use a curious locution of Ule fonn
"true for X," where X is some person or group, and
would say Ulat the belief tllat slavery is justified was
true for my great-grandfather. But to say tllat some belief
of mine is true for me is eiUler just to say tllat I believe
it or is evidence of some deep muddle about tlle relation
between trutll and belief. To suggest Ulat slavery was
morally justified for my ancestors, because they
believed it was, is exactly as sensible a~ suggesting tllat
Alorese reproductive physiology was different from
that of contemporary Italians, because Alorese and
Italian beliefs differed. Cultures can just be mistaken,
as can individuals. And mistakes, by cultures or
individuals, need not be criminal and may in some
cases be almost inescapable.
(That two cultures have coamcting moral rules
need not mean that eiUler is incon·eet. There are some
matters about which it is import.lnt to have a rule, but
exactly which rule is chosen is morally indifferent.
Such cases are common in tlle law. It is essential to
specify which side of Ule road traffic will keep to, but
eitller side will do.)
There is scientific progress, and there is moral
progress. The buman race is, in general, more free of
unjustified discrimination tllan it was 50 years ago.
Freedom of speech is more widely recognized, at least
on paper. The rights of individuals to deviate from the
norm, to be left alone, and to have their special needs
met, are more widely granted. We are, as a species, less
racist and less sexist tllCUl we used to be. Slavery is
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tolerated almost nowhere. This is moral progress.
Moral progress is not as striking and perhaps not as
widespread as scientific and technological progress,
but it has been made.
It has been claimed that scientific disputes are
decidable in ways that eiliical disputes are not. Of
course some low level scientific questions can be
answered in satisfyingly clear-cut ways. The question
of whether a particular Tursiops brain weighs 1600 or
1700 grams may be quite easy to answer. The question
of the mean brain weight for adults of that species can
also be answered, if not so easily. But consider tile
following pair of questions. Is the weight of porpoise
brains of any significance for our judgments of IX)rpoise
intelligence? Is porpoise intelligence of any signif
icance for our jUdgments of the moral status of
porpoises? It is not at all apparent how we should even
begin to search for answers to iliese questions. But it is
not obvious that an answer to tile moral member of iliis
pair need be any more elusive ilian an answer to tile
scientific member.
Many of the most interesting and important
questions cannot be resolved by measurement. Take the
opposition between evolutionary ilieory and so-called
creationism. I am convinced of tlle reality of evolution,
but I can point to no particular facts, and certainly to no
measurements, that show creationism to be false.
Creationism is a very poor theory despite the fact that
it, in at least a minimal sense, accounts for all our
observations and measurements. Creationism fails to
cohere with the rest ofour scientific picture of the world,
and it fails to provide genuine, non-question-begging
expla..'1alions. To say that animals and plants are the way
they are because God has made them that way has no
explanatory power, for no matter how plants and
animals were, such an "explanation" would account for
it. An explanation that can be guaranteed to explain any
conceivable phenomenon really explains nothing.
When faced wiili two competing ilieories, one
argues tlmt one is better than tlle other because it
accounts for antecedent intuitions and observations of
various sorts, because it coheres with oilier theories,
because it is powerful in generating explanations, and
so on. This is tlle way scientists argue every day. Such
arguments are analogous to, and sometimes are,
philosophical arguments. Philosophers argue for their
Uleories in just iliese ways, that the theories account for
our experience and for our antecedent beliefs, that they
provide satisfying explanations of Ule phenomena.
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Both scientific and philosophical Uleories sometimes
have unintuitive implications. But if a theory is
otherwise sufficienUy strong, it may force one to reject
or revise Ule "intuitions," bc Uley moral or scientific,
with which it conflicts.
Progress in both science and ethics is a mailer of
developing theories of increasing inclusiveness and
coherence, theories Umt make sense of our intuitions
and discipline them. We are an inquisitive species, and
we want general explanatory theories bOUl of what Ule
world is like and of what is right and wrong. We want a
general account of goodness just as we want a general
account of color; that's the kind of animal we are.
Suppose someone were to object to my assimilation
of eUlics to science by insisting on a fundamental
difference in subject matter. Such an objector claims
iliat Ule increasing coherence and inclusiveness of
scientific theories is an indication of increasing
adequacy because Ulere really are scientific facts. There
is a world out there that we encounter at least
occasionally and partially, and our increasing success
in these encounters indicates Ulat our picture of the
world is improving. But, says this objector, the
increasing coherence and inclusiveness (if such Ulere
is) of ethical Uleory is no guarantee Ulat such theory is
any more than well-constructed myUl, for Ulere is no
extcrnal moral world against which the meory is tested.
This objection may be answered in two ways. First,
one IIIay say Umt our moral intuitions give us Ule same
evidence of an independent moral reality that our
observations give us of scientific reality. Or, second (and
these replies are not incompatible), it may be pointed
out mat on some theories of science (e.g. those of Peirce
and his successors) scientitic truUl is Ulat to which, in
Ule ideal we hope to approach, all researchers agree.
Emical truth can be, and has been, defined in the same
way. What is right is what all fully informed,
disinterested, rational observers agree to be right.
But our objector may persist. "No," he or she may
say, "there really is an objective physical world, as may
be seen from Ule fact that people wiili false scientific
beliefs fail to deal satisfactorily with their enviromnents,
and UlOse with generally correct scientific beliefs
minimize aversive experiences. In contrast, pcople willl
opposed etllical views get along equally well, from
which it may bc inferred Ulat Ulerc is no realm of
objective moral facts." This is a plausible objection,
but it may be rebuued from two ditIerent directions.
First, better eUlical views may well have "survival
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value," especially if me unit considered is a culture
which espouses and inculcates me views. Contrary
bOUl to some folk wisdom and some pop sociobiology,
nice guys and nice societies don't always finish last.
Since they are unlikely to destroy Illemselves, Uley
may well finish first. Second, it is clear Ulat one may
accept false scientific meories and still fare quite well.
Millions of people believe fervenUy in contemporary
astrology, surely one of me most ludicrous meories
imaginable, without discernible decrease in life
expectancy. Devoutly believing in Lysenkoist biology
had great survival value in me Soviet Union for several
decades. These are striking cases but not exceptions.
Most humans can, and many do, live reasonably happy
and successful lives while believing vast numbers of
scientific and metaphysical (and emical) falsehoods.
Curiosity, as I noted earlier, is characteristic of our
species, and some of us have emphasized and
formalized and disciplined this characteristic by
becoming scholars. It is probably salutary, if depressing,
to remind ourselves mat hundreds of millions (billions)
of our conspecifics manage to build and repair
automobiles, win friends and gain power, avoid walking
into walls, and have and raise children without
knowing or caring about the questions, and standards
for answers, that we hold dear. One can tolerate, in oilier
words, a large amount of bad theory, bom in emics and
in science, without significant impact on one's chances
of survival. In order to survive we need only do the
right Uling most of the time. We need not do it for the
right reason, or understand why it is me right mingo
Correct (morally or scientifically) action may well
generally have survival value, but correct explanation
probably does not.
I have not been arguing that emics is exactly like
me sciences. That would be impossible, since ilie
sciences are surely not exactly like one another. My
claim is that ethics is, like physics and history and
psychology and economics, an organized and rational
inquiry into an aspect of Ille world we experience. It
shares with other inquiries a structure in which meories
arc constructed to account for data and data is screened
and sorted in Ule light of theory. There is considerable
deep disagreement in ethical meory at present, and there
are issues about which contending parties care deeply.
The same can be said of olller fields, past and present.
There is no fundamental gap between science and emics.
Let Ulat be enough talk about moral philosophy for
now. It is time to do some.
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II

of the word. It is generally taken tl1at all and only
humans are persons, but tl1is is surely false. Persons
are botl1 moral agents and moral patients. They are
possible contractors. Other moral agents, if there are
any, such as corporations or states, are eitl1er denied to
be moral patients at all or are placed in Group C.
Group B consists of all other sentient beings. These
entities can suffer, and suffering maners. They are,
however, incapable of rational actions and, tl1us, cannot
be moral agents. All sentient nonhuman animals are
placed in this category. Group C consists of a
heterogeneous collection tl1e members of which have
in common iliat they are not sentient and tl1at they are
thought by some persons (at least a few sane persons)
to have intrinsic moral importance. Included here are
species, cultures, states, laws, universities, ecosystems,
and some specific physical objects such as particular
old redwood trees, the Taj Mahal, and Michelangelo's
Piera. Jeremy Bentl1am and many others would deny
any intrinsic moral value to any of these, granting them
at most derivative value consequent on their affecting
or being valued by members of Groups A and B. Other
tl1inkers hold some or all of tl1ese to be genuine moral
patients in their own right. 1here are a number of very-
basic, important, and difficult issues in moral theory
involved in the countenancing of any moral patients in
Group C. Fortunately, they need not be dealt with here,
for our concerns are with Groups A and B and the
relation between tl1em.
Within Group A all moral patients are entitled to
equal consideration. Each (human) person is taken to
be of equal intrinsic value. Of course, if Jones is, and
Smith is not, my parent, child, spouse, fellow soldier,
fellow citizen, or one to whom I have made a promise,
then my obligations to Jones may be stronger than my
obligations to Smitl1. But in tl1emselves, as persons, this
view ranks Jones and Smith as moral peers.
Within Group B, in contrast, it is held that the moral
status of creatures varies widely. Any Group B moral
patient is, on this view, of vastly less significance tl1an
any Group A moral patient (person). But within Group
B, one moral patient (a cat, say) may be much more
important morally tl1an anotl1er (a crab, perhaps). More
serious justification is needed for harming or
discomfiting the "higher" animals tl1an for harming the
"lower." One general principle, accepted at least
verbally by almost everyone who has considered it, is
that pain should not be inflicted needlessly on any
sentient being. A second principle is tl1at the higher

Any moral tlleory must include or presuppose some
tl1eory of moral status. An entity may be a moral agent
or a moral patient or both or neitl1er. A moral agent is
sometl1ing capable of action, tl1e acts of which may
properly be evaluated as right or wrong. My actions
may correctly be so evaluated, but not tl10se of a very
young child. The very young, tl1e insane, tlle severely
retarded, and the comatose are not moral agents.
Normal human adults are and so, perhaps, are adult
animals of some otller species, and perhaps corpora
tions and nations.
A moral patient, on the other hand, is an entity the
treatment of which may properly be evaluated as right
or wrong. A human infant is not a moral agent but is a
moral patient, for it does matter how an infant is
treated. It is wrong to cause unnecessary pain to an
infant, and wrong intrinsically. It may also be wrong to
destroy my favorite pencil, but only derivatively, only
because it makes me unhappy. The pencil is not a moral
patient. Humans are, in general, moral patients and so
are many other sorts of animals. It is wrong, intrinsically
wrong, to cause gratuitous pain to a dog or a mouse or
a porpoise or a seagull.
Since we adult humans are typically both moral
agents and moral patients, it is easy to overlook the
distinction between agency and patiency in the moral
realm. This can lead to serious confusion. I once heard
a paper entitled "Etllics is to Govern Human Beings
Only."4 This sentence is importantly ambiguous, for
it may be taken to mean that only human beings can
be moral agents (only tlley are morally responsible,
only tl1ey can be governed by moral rules) or that only
human beings can be moral patient" (only what is done
to humans is of moral concern). Both of these inter
pretations, I believe, yield false sentences, but the first
is at least faintly plausible while the second is not. It
is easy, if one is not clear on the agent/patient
distinction, to transfer to the second reading some of
tlle plausibility of tlle first.
That otller animals as well as hum,ll1s are moral
patients does not entail tllat they are entitled to equal
moral concern. Not all moral patients are equal. This is
widely but usually obscurely recognized. As a rational
reconstruction of what I take to be common features of
tbe views of most people today, I suggest the following
"theory" of moral patients. Moral patients fall into tllree
groups. Group A consists of persons in the moral sense
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(more intelligent, more aware) the being, the more
urgent must be the need in order to justify the infliction
of harm or pain. 5
To this more or less "official" view most of us
subscribe. But our actions belie our words. We tolerate
abominations such as bull fighting, fox hunting, leghold
trapping, and fur ranching, in all of which "higher"
animals are tortured for entertainment or status-display.
For the production of expensive pate de jois gras and
inexpensive chicken eggs we permit torture and
incredible confinement. We are, further, inconsistent.
Some of us protest with shock and dismay the sale of
horses for meat but do not hesitate to eat a hamburger.
Some of us bemoan the sale of pound animals for
research and buy cosmetics needlessly tested in the eyes
of rabbits. The use of very intelligent animals such as
rats and primates for trivial and repetitive research is
protested only by a very few.
Thus, even within the rational reconstruction of
current moral sense that I have just sketched out there
is a great deal of room for improvement in human
treatment of nonhumans. But in fact the situation is
much worse. For the assumption of a sharp break
between groups A and B is spurious. It was clear to
Aristotle and to many others before and since that
humans are, after all, animals. Since the victory of
Darwin, the fact that honw sapiens is one species among
others has been part of the scientific outlook. It cannot
plausibly be maintained, in the face of the science of
the late 20th century, that there is a yawning gap
between humans and the "merely sentient" rest of the
animal kingdom. 6
Nor is it possible to arrange animals on a single scala
natura with humans clearly and safely at the top.
Animals, humans included, have many sorts of
characteristics and capabilities. To map these would
require n distinct continua or an n-dimensional
continuum, with n some number over 20. It will not do
simply to consider perception, for that resolves itself
into the traditional five senses, plus echolocation,
temperature sense, and several others, and then each
category splits into three factors: range, sensitivity, and
discrimination. What about locomotion? In what media?
Speed or endurance? It seems clearly wrong to try to
reduce intelligence to one measure, for we well know
that we have not yet satisfactorily sorted out the varieties
of human abilities covered by the tenn, and we have
little reason to believe that the human varieties are the
only ones there are. Similar remarks can be made about

Winter & Spring 1994

social behavior, communicative ability, manipulative
skill, and tolerance of environmental change. There are
other continua yet., such as longevity and fecundity. But
we need not, fortunately, even attempt to discover how
many such characteristics there are, for it is clear that
not all differences between animals are morally
significant. Consider the mouse and the bat.
The mouse and the bat are in many ways alike and
in many ways different. If we plot their characteristics
on our various dimensions or continua, we will [md
that on some they occupy nearly or exactly the same
spot., and on some they are far apart. Bats echolocate,
but mice (like us) score a zero on that. Bats fly, mice
don't. Despite the fact that bats and mice are very
different in these ways, they have (at least approx
imately) the same moral status. The different sensory
and locomotor abilities of bats and mice are very
important in making them the sorts of animals they are,
making bats bats and mice mice. But in themselves these
characteristics are of no moral importance. They may
have some derivative moral significance. If, for
instance, it is wrong to prevent a creature from moving
in its natural way, then it is wrong to prevent bats from
flying. But it is not wrong to prevent mice from flying.
Still, the sensory and locomotor differences are not
morally important per se.
In those characteristics that are morally significant.,
here sentience, intelligence, and self-awareness, bats
and mice are, to the best of our knowledge, close
together. So bats and mice have the same moral status
and are due the same sort of consideration from humans.
Of this pair of animals, the mouse is much more like us
than the bat., but we are not morally obliged to care
more about the mouse than the bat. One cannot just
identify "morally significant characteristics" and
"characteristics similar to those of humans."
Now suppose extraterrestrials to arrive from some
distant star system. Suppose that they are intelligent,
they are distinct individuals, and that they find some
means of communicating with us. Beyond that, suppose
that they are as different from us as you can imagine.
They are predominantly gaseous, their chemistry is not
based on carbon, their sensory apparatus is radically
unlike ours and mostly operates on parts of the
electromagnetic spectrum closed to us, and so on. But
tlley are intelligent; they can communicate; they have a
sense of self; and they are capable of suffering and
enjoyment. 10ey are, in short, persons. It makes a great
deal of difference how we treat them. Their moral status,
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full personhood, is for many purposes far weightier than
that of a mouse, despite tile fact that the mouse is
enormously more like us. As many philosophers have
been insisting for years, "human" and "person" do not
express tlle same concept.? Given a choice between
saving an irretrievably comatose human and one of these
extraterrestrials, it would be wrong not to give
preference to tlle extraterrestrial. The point is tllat
morally relevant characteristics are a proper subset of
all characteristics and are not those peculiar to humans.
What characteristics are morally significant, tllen?
There is no clear consensus among moral philosophers
on tl1is question, but we can list some candidate
characteristics. Sentience will appear on almost every
list. By sentience is meant awareness of sensation and
tlle ability to enjoy and to suffer. Those of us who tllink
notlling of chopping up a live carrot but object to
chopping up a live fish usually do so on tlle grounds
that a fish is sentient and a carrot isn't. Otller candidate
characteristics include memory, a sense of self, the loose
cluster of abilities called "intelligence," ability to
communicate, concern for conspecifics, playfulness,
and possession of an inullortal soul.
Almost all of these candidate (for moral signifi
cance) characteristics are variable. 8 An aninlal may have
a more or less definite sense of self, be more or less
sentient, may communicate more or less broadly and
flexibly. Most of these, in otller words, admit of degree.
When one is ascribing some status, moral or otller, on
the basis of characteristics tllat can vary in degree more
or less continuously, there is a strong temptation to a
sort of fallacious reasoning I will call ''magic lines or
slippery slopes." Consider tlle height of adult male
humans. There is considerable variation among
populations, but in almost any context, a man 135cm
tall is short and a man 230cm tall is tall. It seems
plausible to say tllat a man .lnull taller tllan a short
man is short, and a man .1null shorter tllan a tall man is
tall. A contradiction is easily obtained, for by adding
and subtracting in units of .lmm it now can be shown
tllat a man of any height one chooses is both tall and
short. This sort of fallacy is the slippery slope. If one
believes that slippery slopes can be prevented only by
magic lines, one has to believe tl1at there must be some
precise height which marks the boundary between tall
and short, or more plausibly, two precise heights
dividing the range into tall, medium, and short. In tllis
case, however, it is quite obvious tllat there are no such
magic lines. There are no sharp demarcations between
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the short, the medium, and tlle tall. But some men are
tall, some are short, and most are in between. There are
no magic lines, but tlle slope is not slippery.
In moral matters we seem particularly liable to this
sort of fallacious tllinking. In tlle abortion controversy
many find only extreme positions tenable, and others
seek magic lines at conception or quickening or
viability or birth.
It is instructive to consider a concept much like many
of the concepts of moral status, that of maturity. (In
fact maturity is in part a matter of moral status.) Almost
all of the factors relevant to maturity vary in degree.
For several purposes it is necessary to stipulate magic
lines for maturity. For most purposes, in the United
States, one is counted as legally mature at age 18. But
for marriage one may be counted as mature at age 16,
and for the consumption of alcohol at 21. If someone
were to ask "But what is tlle age at which one is really
mature?," he or she would betray deep ignorance of
tlle concept or of the facts. At 18 Elmo may be mature
sexually and politically, immature emotionally,
intellectually, and physically. Some never attain
emotional and intellectual maturity but must be
counted as full-fledged adults. Even if we have all
possible information about Sally, and agreement that
she is mature, it will still probably not be possible to
say precisely when she became so. There certainly is
such a state as maturity, but there are no magic line
criteria for it.
What is the application 'of all this to nonhuman
animals? I want specifically to consider cetaceans, the
whales and porpoises. What level of membership should
they hold in the moral community? They obviously
are sentient and, thus, moral patients of some sort.
Even those few who favor continued whaling find it
necessary to give at least lip service to the need for
humane methods of killing. On the rational recon
struction of popular views offered above (and rejected
as inadequate) everyone would place cetaceans at least
in Group B. Some, still within the person/nonperson
framework, would argue that (at least some) cetaceans
should be placed in Group A, Le., are persons.
Champions of cetacean personhood point to a number
of characteristics, including intelligence as shown in
behavior and evidenced by large brains, complex social
behavior including extensive mutual aid, playfulness
both intra- and inter-specific, ability to communicate,
interest in and solicitude for humans, inspiration ofawe
in humans, and unique places in ecosystems.
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I will set aside the last two items, because (a) that
something inspires awe in humans does not even entail
that it is sentient; consider the "starry heavens above
and the moral law within" of Kant's famous line,9 and
(b) as far as I can tell, everything that is part of any
ecosystem has a unique place in that ecosystem.
Of the remaining characteristics, no one, and no
pair, will suffice to establish the personhood of
cetaceans (or of anything else). Many animals,
including insects, have complex social organizations
with appropriate individual behavior. Some sort of
communication has been observed in almost every
vertebrate species, and notoriously in honeybees. Yet
almost no one would suggest that the social and
communicative honeybees are persons. Many animals
play, and at least some (cats and dogs) play with
members of other species. Many animals help one
another. It is not uncommon, but it is futile, to attempt
to find or construct a magic line in one or other of
these characteristics. 10
There remains intelligence. If information
processing is central for intelligence, and intelligence
criterial for personhood, it is but a short step to the
question of rights for robots. If, on the other hand,
one takes the adaptation of means to ends to constitute
intelligence, then a vast number of species, including
all the cetaceans, are well within Ule intelligent fold.
But there are many varieties and aspects of intelligence,
and even summing over Ulem all, intelligence isn't
everything. This is, of course, my point; no single
characteristic is everyUling. There are no magic lines
dividing fields of moral status.
Cetaceans are entitled to special moral consideration
not because of some single characteristic but because
they possess very high degrees of a number of morally
important characteristics. They are highly intelligent,
highly social, and capable of sophisticated conunu
nication. It appears that at least some sorts of cetaceans
may well have as much right to be considered persons
as do humans. If, as I suggest. we abandon the sharp
person/nonperson distinction, we can say tlml some
cetaceans are at least quasi-persons.
Similarly, tlle conclusion tlmt tlle great apes are at
least quasi-persons is inescapable. They are highly
intelligent, highly social, self-aware, communicative
beings. Most of the rest of the primates probably deserve
nearly the same status. Our mistreallnent of ow' primate
cousins is even less excusable theUl our misu'eatment
of cetaceans, since apes and monkeys are literally
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anthropomorphic. They are so obviously close to us
how can we use them as we do?
How should we treat quasi-persons? Clearly their
enjoyment and suffering matter and must be taken into
account. But that is surely not enough. We owe more
than just consideration, we owe respect. We must respect
their interests and their autonomy. The first thing we
must do in regard to cetaceans and apes is to let them
be, let them live their own lives as they choose. When
their interests and ours come into conflict, as is sure to
happen from time to time, interests must be weighed as
impartially as possible. We owe quasi-persons, as we
owe persons, consideration, respect. and justice.
There is no magic line between persons and the
rest of tlle sentient world, and there are no magic lines
witllin the sentient world. It is not just persons and
quasi-persons but all conscious living things that are
entitled, in many ways and to varying degrees, to
consideration, respect, and justice. The levels of moral
status are continuous, and can never reach zero while
sentience remains.
Nothing I have said in this paper answers any
specific questions about human treatment of nonhuman
animals. I hope to have helped make clear that these
are genuine moral questions and that moral questions
are genuine questions.
Notes
I This is a very extensively revised version of a paper,
"Science, Ethics, and the Status of Cetaceans," written after
a conference entitled "Cetacean Intelligence and Behavior
and the Ethics of Killing Cetaceans," held in Washington,
D.C., U.S.A., in 1980 under the auspices of the International
Whaling Commission.
2 For a useful survey and critique of modern ethics of
virtue see Robert B. Louden, "Some Vices of Virtue Ethics,"
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 21, NO.3 (July, 1984).

3 Cora Du Bois, The People of Alor, (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1944) (reprinted New York:
Halper and Row, 1961), p. 106.
4 Translated title of paper delivered at the conference
referred to in note 1.

5 Or death. But many would deny that it is wrong to kill a
nonhuman animal, without denying that it is wrong to cause
pain without need.
6 Here and throughout this paper I am comparing adult
animals of one species with adult animals of another. The
questions of the moral status of nonhuman animals, of
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(human) abortion, and of (human) infanticide are closely
related; all concern standing in the moral community. At six
weeks a human seems clearly inferior to a beagle of the same
age in every morally relevant characteristic. Why then do we
assign higher status to the human infant? Are we justified in
doing so? I am glad to be able, on grounds of length, to exclude
such issues from this paper.

8 An exception is possession of an immortal soul.
Presumably this is not a matter of degree--either one has
such a soul or one does not. But if it is held that all humans
have such a soul and no nonhuman animals do, it would appear
that it is much worse to kill a porpoise or a pigeon than to kill
a human. The human's soul, on this view, continues to exist,
but to deprive the animal of bodily existence is to deprive it
of everything.

7 Of course the terms "human" and "person" are often
used as synonymous, whether philosophers like it or not, but
this causes considerable conceptual trouble. In Christian
doctrine the three persons of the Trinity are all persons, but
only one is human. On Star Trek the Klingons are persons,
but not humans, and Mr. Spock is clearly a person although
only half human. So, it is at least conceptually possible to be
a person without being a human. That one may be a human
without being a person is hotly denied in some quarters,
affirmed in others. Fetuses and the comatose are central to
this dispute. The less controversial cases of nonhuman persons
suffice to show the need to separate these concepts.

Between the Species

9 Critique of Practical Reason, Conclusion, p. 161, Vol.
V of the Prussian Academy edition.
10 For example, those who would draw a magic line in
communication, below which there is only signaling, and
above which, in humans alone, lies true language, have been
driven by ape language research to ever more desperate
complications. Whatever can be found that at least some
human linguistic behavior has and ape behavior lacks will be
pronounced essential for 'real' language (until it is shown
that the apes can do it).
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